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ABSTRACT
The United States Navy has recognized the rising age of its nuclear reactors. With this
increasing age comes increasing importance of backup generators. In addition to the need for
decay heat removal common to all (naval and commercial) nuclear reactors, naval vessels with
nuclear reactors also require a backup means of propulsion. All underway Navy nuclear reactors
are operated with diesel generators as a backup power system, able to provide emergency electric
power for reactor decay heat removal as well as enough electric power to supply an emergency
propulsion mechanism. While all commercial nuclear reactors are required to incorporate
multiple backup generators, naval submarine nuclear plants feature a single backup generator.
The increasing age of naval nuclear reactors, coupled with the dual requirements of a
submarine's solitary backup generator, makes the study of submarine backup generators vital.
This thesis examines more than 7,000 maintenance records dated 1989 to 2005 for emergency
diesel generator engines onboard Los Angeles class nuclear submarines. This class of
submarines, which features the Fairbanks Morse 8-cylinder air-started opposed-piston diesel
engine, is expected to continue to operate until at least 2020. An analysis of corrective and
routine maintenance tasks was conducted. Analysis included the diesel engine as well as its
subsystems of diesel lube oil, diesel freshwater, diesel seawater, diesel air start, and diesel fuel
oil. The analysis centered on maintenance task times and costs. Time factors analyzed included
the time between maintenance actions, the time awaiting parts, the time to conduct the
maintenance, and the impacts on operational availability. Cost factors analyzed included the
material costs and the manpower costs (both sailors and off-hull workers). As patterns were
recognized, high impact items were highlighted and recommendations to reduce risk to
operational availability were given.
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel D. Frey
Title: Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Engineering Systems
Thesis Reader: Timothy J. McCoy
Title: Associate Professor of Naval Construction and Engineering
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Chapter 1 Introduction
United States Navy operational submarines are nuclear powered. Future submarines will
continue to be nuclear powered, unless non-nuclear propulsion processes can make
improvements in their mobility and endurance.
"Diesel submarines are the wrong ships for the United States. Diesel (and other
non-nuclear propelled) submarines do not match the forward, globally oriented
responsibilities and strategy of the United States and cannot operate far from U.S.
shores for extended periods. They do not have the mobility, covertness,
endurance, or firepower to meet U.S. military requirements for submarines....
Because of their stealth, endurance, and multi-mission capability, and lethality,
nuclear submarines conduct missions that no one else can replicate, and offer
American taxpayers a tremendous return on investment. SSNs pack enormous
capability into a very small space. Nuclear-powered submarines are in a class by
themselves. No other weapon platform provides the survivability,
maneuverability, and sustainability - combined with firepower - of an SSN." [1]
This reliance on nuclear power necessarily implies a reliance on a means to remove
reactor decay heat in the event of a reactor shutdown. Both military and civilian nuclear reactors
need emergency diesel generators to power decay heat removal equipment in the event of a loss
of electrical power. "Every [commercial] nuclear power plant has at least two diesel generators
that provide emergency electrical power in the event that all offsite electrical power is lost." [2]
Submarine emergency diesel generators are especially critical for several reasons.
* They power equipment to remove decay heat from the reactor.
" They power equipment that provides emergency propulsion for the submarine at sea.
* They provide one of the two means of ventilating the submarine.
" Weight and volume considerations restrict the number of emergency diesel generators to
one per submarine.
* Limited weight and volume (and therefore capacity) is allotted to the submarine main
storage battery.
* The average age of US submarine nuclear reactors will increase.
Although his emphasis was on designing and building rugged, reliable and safe reactor
plants, US Navy Admiral K. H. Donald's comments affirm the submarine's increased
dependence on the emergency diesel generator. ADM Donald is the Director of Naval Nuclear
Propulsion.
7
"The key challenge in fleet support is the fact that our plants are aging. The
average reactor plant has operated for about 19 years in 2004 and that will
increase to nearly 24 years in 2011. With this aging come complexities and some
occasional surprises." [3]
These older reactor plants will for the most part be onboard Los Angeles class
submarines, as reported by the Director of Submarine Warfare, Rear Admiral Joseph Walsh.
"Looking out to 2011, four out of five submarines in the Submarine Force will be 688 Class
submarines." [4] Serious consideration needs to be given to the systems responsible for
responding in the event of a submarine nuclear reactor incident. One of those systems is the
emergency diesel generator. This thesis analyzes maintenance records for the emergency diesel
generator carried on the Los Angeles class submarines.
The specific diesel carried onboard all Los Angeles class submarines is the Fairbanks
Morse opposed piston 8 cylinder 850kW 720rpm 1207hP engine-generator. The support systems
include diesel lube oil, diesel freshwater, diesel seawater, diesel air start, and diesel fuel oil.
Maintenance records pertaining to the diesel engine and its support systems were analyzed.
8
Chapter 2 Conduct and Recording of Diesel Engine Maintenance
2.1 Types of Maintenance
Navy maintenance conducted generally falls in to two categories - preventative and
corrective. These maintenance actions may or may not require replacement parts, and may or
may not require significant man-hour expenditures. Regardless of the effort required, every
preventative and corrective maintenance action is recorded in the Current Ship's Maintenance
Plan (CSMP).
Although some experimentation has been made in the area of condition-based
maintenance, the fleet continues to rely on the Preventive Maintenance System (PMS). [5] The
preventative maintenance is performed primarily by sailors assigned to the submarine (Ship's
Force), but some maintenance items require the assistance of the local Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (IMA).
Corrective maintenance is also primarily performed by Ship's Force, but may also require
assistance from the local IMA. Failures of high import are generally considered equipment
"casualties" and are additionally reported from the individual submarine to higher authority by
submitting a Casualty Report (CASREP).
As stated earlier, the diesel generator supplies power to decay heat removal pumps in the
event of an extended reactor shutdown at sea. Thus, the consequences of a diesel generator
failure are serious. In addition to regularly scheduled maintenance, qualified inspectors
periodically perform diesel engine inspections. [6]
2.2 Maintenance Record Availability
Not all submarine diesel engine maintenance records are available for public
consumption.
Information about submarine diesel engines is indirectly related to the nuclear propulsion
plant. Information related to the propulsion plant can be designated as Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Information (NNPI). Generally, NNPI is not made publicly available. NNPI was not used in the
completion of this thesis.
Information relating to the location or operating patterns of submarines is also generally
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classified and not available to the public. In addition to information regarding the nature of the
failure or malfunction of the equipment involved, CASREPs generally also include information
about the location of the submarine experiencing the casualty. For this reason, CASREP reports
are classified and were not available for use in this thesis.
Submarine diesel engine inspection records were also deemed to be not publicly
releasable, for reasons neither readily apparent nor adequately explained to the author.
The CSMP, which contains both preventative and corrective maintenance actions, is
generally not classified. These records were made available.
10
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Chapter 3 Preliminary Review of Diesel Engine Maintenance
Records
3.1 Raw Data
Maintenance records for all 62 Los Angeles class submarines dating from 1989 to 2005
were obtained from the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning, and Procurement
(SUBMEPP) Activity. A list of maintenance record fields with their meanings is shown in
[Table 1] below. The meanings are taken from reference [7].
Table 1: Maintenance Record Fields
Action I aKen Uoae Describes the action taken to complete the
maintenance, using a single digit and, if
necessary, a single letter.
Cause Code Describes the primary or overriding cause of the
failure or malfunction when the need for
maintenance was first discovered.
CSMP Narrative Summary Current Ship's Maintenance Plan condensed (30
characters or less) description of the problem.
Date Closing The date the work request was signed off as
complete.
EIC Equipment Identification Code, a seven-
character code that identifies the equipment
Equipment Nomenclature Noun name of the equipment (should match the
Equipment Identification Code).
JCN Job Control Number - a unique identifier
consisting of the submarine Unit Identification
Code, the Work Center, and the Job Sequence
Number.
11
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Table 1: Maintenance Record Fields (continued)
Narrative Data Describes what is wrong and what needs to be
done.
Priority Code Priority of the maintenance item (mandatory,
essential, highly desirably, desirable).
Safety Code If necessary, used to indicate the level of safety
issue resulting from the failure or malfunction.
Ship Class Restricted to Los Angeles Class (SSN 688)
Ship Type Hull Individual hull numbers (SSN 693, SSN 760,
etc.)
Status Code Describes the effect of the failure or
malfunction on the operational capability of the
equipment when the need for maintenance was
first discovered.
Total IMA Man Hours Hours expended by the Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (not the submarine's
crew).
Total Repair Replacement Cost Expenditure on repair parts only.
Total Ship Force Man Hours Hours expended by the submarine's crew after
submitting initial maintenance request.
When Discovered Code Identifies when the need for maintenance was
discovered (during operation, startup, shutdown,
inspection, etc.)
When Discovered Date Date the failure or malfunction was discovered.
Not all 62 submarines were in commission during the years covered by the maintenance records
(1989-2005). A list of commissioning and decommissioning dates is provided in [Table 2]
below. [8, 9]
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Table 2: Los Angeles Class Submarine Commissioning and Decommissioning Dates
688 11/13/76 '113 9/Zb/Z (bz //ZV/4/
689 6/25/77 11/1/93 714 5/21/83 763 1/8/94
690 6/25/77 715 11/5/83 764 11/7/92
691 12/17/77 716 5/12/84 765 3/13/93
692 3/11/78 2/7/95 717 11/17/84 766 9/16/94
693 6/10/78 1/5/95 718 7/6/85 767 11/6/93
694 7/8/78 9/16/96 719 7/27/85 768 12/10/94
695 12/16/78 3/27/97 720 11/23/85 769 2/24/95
696 3/3/78 12/1/95 721 9/27/86 770 8/18/95
697 1/5/80 4/1/98 722 9/12/87 771 10/9/95
698 3/28/81 723 7/9/88 772 2/16/96
699 5/16/81 724 11/8/86 773 9/13/96
700 7/18/81 725 7/11/87
701 10/24/81 750 6/3/89
702 12/19/81 9/18/97 751 8/6/88
703 1/30/82 3/1/99 752 2/11/89
704 7/24/85 10/1/97 753 4/7/90
705 1/8/83 754 10/21/89
706 5/21/83 755 6/30/90
707 10/1/83 9/10/04 756 1/26/91
708 3/17/84 757 6/29/91
709 9/8/84 758 9/28/91
710 9/19/85 759 2/29/92
711 4/24/81 760 4/11/92
712 3/6/82 3/1/99 761 1/9/93
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3.2 Ensuring Unique, Relevant Records
A total of 7019 records were examined. An analysis of the Job Control Number revealed
2401 records were duplicates of other records in all fields except Narrative Data. These
Narrative Data comments were appended to the original matching record.
Of the remaining 4618 records, three records were misclassified; these records did not
involve the diesel engine or its support systems. Sixty records belonged to AD 41 or AS 39 ship
classes. Seven belonged to a diesel engine at Naval Submarine School. Fifteen records had
invalid JCNs and could not be attributed to Los Angeles class submarine emergency diesel
engines.
Of the 4533 remaining records, eleven records had unique JCNs but were upon closer
inspection determined to be redundant records. The redundant records had (1) identical When
Discovered Dates and Dates Closing, (2) an Action Taken Code of 4 (Canceled), (3) a Total Ship
Force Man Hours of 1, and (4) a record with the next sequential Job Control Number that
described the identical issue. 4522 unique, relevant records remained for further analysis.
3.3 Additional Data Fields and Key Metrics
Several additional maintenance record fields were necessary for analytical use. These
additional fields are described in [Table 3] below.
Table 3: Additional Maintenance Fields
Elapsed Days The difference between Date Closing and When Discovered
Date. This differs from the traditional Time To Repair in that
the When Discovered Date and Date Closing do not necessarily
coincide with the commencement and conclusion of repair,
respectively.
Total Hours The addition of Total IMA Man Hours and Total Ship Force
Man Hours.
Fiscal Year The fiscal year based on the Date Closing.
14
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Table 3: Additional Maintenance Fields (continued)
Inflation Index Using 2006 as the base tiscal year (1.U), an index is calculated
based on 4.0% inflation using the simple formula:
Inflation Index = 1.04(2006 -FY)
FY06 Repair Cost Adjusts the Total Repair Replacement Cost to the current fiscal
year by the multiplying it by the Inflation Index.
FY06 IMA Labor Cost Uses current labor rates of $60/hour applied to Total IMA Man
Hours.
FY06 S/F Labor Cost Uses current labor rates of $30/hour applied to Total Ship Force
Man Hours. This is based on the generic enlisted sailor
personnel cost of $60,000 annually (salary and benefits).
FY06 Labor Cost IMA Labor Cost plus S/F Labor Cost.
FY06 Total Cost Adds the Repair Cost and the Labor Cost.
Hourly Labor Rate Divides the FY06 Labor Cost by the Total Hours.
Time Since Last Maintenance The difference between the Date Closing of the most recent
Action previous maintenance action on the same Ship Type Hull and
the When Discovered Date of the current maintenance action.
This differs from the traditional Time Between Failures in that
more than one maintenance action can be ongoing at any one
time.
From these additional data fields, five key metrics were chosen: Elapsed Days, Total
Hours, FY06 Repair Cost, FY06 Labor Cost, and FY06 Total Cost. These metrics are further
analyzed in Chapter 4.
3.4 Records Affecting Operational Availability
Operational availability (Ao) is simply the ability for the submarine to effectively
perform its mission. A submarine would ideally have an operational availability of one, but a
more typical operational availability would be on the order of 0.6. This figure would mean that
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the submarine is ready to perform its mission 60 percent of the time, on average. Planned or
unplanned periods of heavy maintenance impact operational availability.
Whether diesel engine maintenance actions impacted operational availability or not can
be gleaned from analyzing the maintenance record fields Priority Code, Safety Code, and Status
Code. A Priority Code of 1 (mandatory) or 2 (essential), or a Safety Code of 1 (critical safety or
health deficiency) or 2 (serious safety or health deficiency), or a Status Code of 2 (non-
operational) would indicate an action adversely affecting operational availability. The total
number of maintenance actions meeting at least one of these criteria was 1277, or 28 percent of
the 4522 unique, relevant records.
Additional analysis was performed on these records. In an effort to determine availability
for the diesel engine onboard each submarine, or Ship Hull Type, two quantities were
established. The average Time Since Last Maintenance was considered analogous to the Mean
Time Between Failures (MTBF), and the average Elapsed Days was considered analogous to the
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). An availability measure (A) was established to be the
following:
AshjpipiuiiType MTBFShipHun Type
MTBFshipHulType+ MTTRShipHulType
An availability measure of 1.0 would indicate that, no matter how often the diesel engine
failed, the repair took no time to effect, so the machine was always available. An availability
measure of 0.0 would indicate that, no matter how fast the repair could be completed, the
machine would fail as soon as the repair was complete and thus never be available.
16
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Chapter 4 Analysis Results
The key metrics for the maintenance records are shown in [Table 4] below, compared
with averages for all records and for those records not affecting operational availability. The key
metrics are individually discussed below.
Table 4: Key Metric Averages
89 days 43 hours $654 $1597 $2251
Records Affecting Ao 94 days 72 hours $1042 $2924 $3966
Records Not Affecting Ao 87 days 31 hours $502 $1075 $1577
17
All Records
4.1 Elapsed Days
The similar elapsed days, shown in [Table 5] and [Figure 1] below, calls into question the
definitions for Priority Code, Status Code, and Safety Code. If the records affecting Ao truly
were a higher priority, why were they not completed faster than other records?
Table 5: Comparison of Elapsed Days
All Records 89 days 88 days Z31 days
Records Affecting Ao 94 days 94 days 255 days
Records Not Affecting Ao 87 days 84 days 221 days
Figure 1: Histogram of Elapsed Days
Histogram of Elapsed Days
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Em Relative Frequency, Other Records
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4.2 Total Hours
The difference in hours expended, as shown in [Table 6] and [Figure 2] below, makes
intuitive sense. Maintenance actions reconciling debilitating degradation naturally require
greater effort than others.
Table 6: Comparison of Total Hours
All Records 43 hours 25 hours 80 hours
Records Affecting Ao 72 hours 46 hours 134 hours
Records Not Affecting A0  31 hours 20 hours 60 hours
Figure 2: Histogram of Total Hours
Histogram of Total Hours
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4.3 FY06 Repair Cost
Most repairs require relatively few, inexpensive parts, as shown in [Table 7] and [Figure
3] below. This is true regardless of the effect on operational availability. Those actions affecting
Ao have a slight tendency to require more expensive parts.
Table 7: Comparison of FY06 Repair Cost
All Records
Records Affecting Ao $1042 $60 $1162
Records Not Affecting Ao $502 $64 $802
Figure 3: Histogram of FY06 Repair Cost
Histogram of FY06 Repair Cost
Relative Frequency, Records Affecting Operational Avaiability
Relative Frequency, Other Records
Cumulative %, Records Affecting Operational Availability
- - - - Cumulative %, Other Records
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4.4 FY06 Labor Cost
Although average Labor Hours for A0 actions vs. non-Ao actions ratio at 2.3:1, the
average FY06 Labor Cost compares at 2.7:1, as shown in [Table 8] and [Figure 4] below.
Table 8: Comparison of FY06 Labor Cost
All Records $19/ $811 3i 11(
Records Affecting Ao $2924 $1683 $5299
Records Not Affecting Ao $1075 $624 $2182
Figure 4: Histogram of FY06 Labor Cost
Histogram of FY06 Labor Cost
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FY06 Labor Cost, in $125 bins
Why is the labor cost ratio disproportionately higher than the labor hours ratio? The Ao
actions require more expensive labor (IMA) to complete, as shown in [Table 9] below. The
hourly labor rate is simply the FY06 Labor Cost divided by the Labor Hours.
21
Table 9: Comparison of Hourly Labor Rate
All Records $33.86 $31.17 $45.OZ
Records Affecting Ao $35.78 $31.17 $53.21
Records Not Affecting Ao $33.10 $31.17 $31.44
4.5 FY06 Total Cost
Not surprisingly, average FY06 Total Cost for Ao actions exceeds those for other
maintenance actions, as shown in [Table 10] and [Figure 5] below.
Table 10: Comparison of FY06 Total Cost
All Records $2251 $1278 $4392
Records Affecting AO $3966 $2331 $7449
Records Not Affecting Ao $1577 $967 $3274
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Figure 5: Histogram of FY06 Total Cost
Histogram of Total Cost
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4.6 Availability
The records affecting operational availability were further analyzed to measure diesel
engine availability as defined in Chapter 3. The availability figures varied greatly among hulls,
as shown in [Table 11] below. Additional availability information can be found in Appendix A.
Table 11: Availability Measures by Hull Number
SSN 723 SSN 692
Mean Time Between Failures 205 days 5dy'71dy
SSN 697 SSN 716
Mean Time To Repair 87 days 203 days 21 days2
SSN 723 SSN 773
Availability 0.623
0.071 0.963
23
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Notes:
1. Several hulls had a negative mean time between failures (SSNs 699, 700, 702, 708, 709,
714, 725, 755, 764, 765, and 772), meaning that on average, a second maintenance action
would begin prior to completing the first one. These data for these hulls are not included
in this table.
2. SSN 689 had only one maintenance action affecting operational availability, lasting 10
days. The datum for this hull is not included in this table.
24
Chapter 5 Conclusion
5.1 Findings
1. Diesel engine maintenance actions adversely affecting operational availability, on average:
" Require more labor hours
" Utilize more expensive repair parts
* Require more expensive labor
" Are not necessarily handled more expeditiously than other maintenance actions; on the
contrary: they actually take slightly longer to reconcile.
2. Most diesel engine maintenance actions are inexpensive and require minimal effort.
3. Diesel engine availability is difficult to measure. What can be measured varies greatly from
submarine to submarine.
5.2 Recommendations
1. Develop a means of reporting the relevance of the maintenance action to operation
availability.
2. Improve the methods of data entry for this system. Analysis of the data was hindered by data
entry errors. This improvement could be implemented through the Navy's diesel repair
course.
5.3 Future Work
1. Analyze the outlying 10 percent of the maintenance actions for each of the key metrics to
discover any trends.
2. Continue further analysis of other maintenance codes to identify issues (see Appendices B
through G).
3. Utilize similar methodology to examine diesel generator maintenance records.
4. Utilize similar methodology to examine other pieces of equipment onboard nuclear
submarines and other naval vessels.
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Appendix A: Availability Data by Submarine Hull
Figure 6: Availability Data by Submarine Hull
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Appendix B: Action Taken Code
Table 12: Action Taken Code Frequency and Meaning
U 4U/ None o tne below
1 2344 Maintenance Action Completed; Parts Drawn from Supply
11 1 X this is supposed to be 1
1A 8 Maintenance Requirement Could Have Been Deferred
1B 44 Maintenance Requirement Was Necessary
Maintenance Action Completed
2 406 Required Parts Not Drawn from Supply
(local manufacture, pre-expended bins, etc.)
2A 2 Maintenance Requirement Could Have Been Deferred
2B 13 Maintenance Requirement Was Necessary
2T 2 The Equipment Being Reported Had a Time Meter
3 640 Maintenance Action Completed; No Parts Required
3A 2 Maintenance Requirement Could Have Been Deferred
3B 9 Maintenance Requirement Was Necessary
3T 1 The Equipment Being Reported Had a Time Meter
4 338 Canceled
5B 1 Fully Completed Alteration
Maintenance Action Completed; 2-M (Miniature/
7 5
Microminiature Electronic Modules) Capability Utilized.
74 1 X this is supposed to be 7e
7A 6 Parts Drawn from Supply Utilized
7B 4 Parts Not Drawn from Supply Utilized
7C 5 Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) Utilized
7D 33 ATE and Parts Drawn from Supply Utilized
7E 6 ATE and Parts Not Drawn from Supply Utilized
8 1 Periodic Time Meter/Cycle Counter reporting
blank 254 (Not allowed by the instruction)
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Figure 7: Breakdown by Action Taken Code
Breakdown by Action Taken Code
0 Avg Days U Avg Hours A Avg Cost
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A
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S150 - - $3,0000
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-
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50 [$1,000
50 $500
0$0
0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 blank
Action Taken Code
Notes:
1. Action Taken Code 5 represents only one maintenance action.
2. Action Taken Code 7 represents the most effective use of manpower - it has the
highest man-hours per Elapsed Days ratio.
3. The high cost of Action Taken Code 2 may be explained y the repair parts coming
from outside the usual supply channels.
4. A blank Action Taken Code - not allowed by the instruction - seems to be an
identifier of negligence. These maintenance actions took the least amount of man-
hours but were the longest to resolve.
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Appendix C: Cause Code
This is a code best describing the cause of the failure or malfunction when the need for
maintenance was first discovered. When more than one cause contributed to the failure or
malfunction, the primary or overriding one is selected.
Table 13: Cause Code Frequency and Meaning
2478
OTHER OR NO MALFUNCTION.
Needs to be explained in the Remarks field. Examples: 1) Fatigue
or physical stress brought on by prolonged work periods or
excessive heat, humidity, or noise. 2) Desire to save time and
effort by taking shortcut and jury-rigging equipment. 3)
Malfunction occurred when installing a field change to improve
equipment effectiveness, or when the cause resulted from a
personnel oriented deficiency affecting safety due to fatigue, etc.
ABNORMAL ENVIRONMENT.
1 93 Exposure to conditions more extreme than those reasonably
expected in the normal shipboard environment (e.g., electrical
equipment sprayed by salt water, or compartment flooded).
MANUFACTURER/INSTALLATION DEFECTS.
2 149 Material not assembled or manufactured 
per specifications, or
installed improperly by IMA or Depot (e.g., motor with open
circuit armature).
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR SKILL.
Failure or malfunction of the equipment due to insufficient
3 57 training, experience, or physical coordination 
of the operator,
maintainer, or other personnel (e.g., not knowing equipment
limitations such as the danger of a low speed wheel on a high
speed grinder).
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0
Table 13: Cause Code Frequency and Meaning (continued)
3
UUMMUNIUAJIUNS VNUbLLM.
A breakdown in the passing, receiving, or understanding of
information (e.g., failure to hear or receive a complete message
due to noise or mechanical or electrical interference).
INADEQUATE INSTRUCTION/PROCEDURE.
The instruction or procedures guide has omissions, errors,
5 26
ambiguities, or other deficiencies (e.g., technical manual omits
lubricant type).
INADEQUATE DESIGN.
Material manufactured and installed per specifications failed
6 62 prematurely during normal usage under normal environmental
conditions (e.g., steam piping orientation precludes adequate
draining during warm-up).
NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR.
7 1658 Material requires replacement after long service and/or as a result
of PMS (e.g., pump wear rings replaced during PMS).
8 7 CORROSION CONDITION.
32
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Figure 8: Breakdown by Cause Code
Breakdown by Cause Code
E Avg Days * Avg Hours A Avg Cost
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- $1,200
- $600
- $00
5 6 7 80 1 2 3 4
Cause Code
Notes:
1. The apparently most effective codes, Cause Code 4 and 8, represent only three and
seven maintenance actions, respectively.
2. Cause Code 1, with 93 maintenance actions, represents a relatively effective man-
hours per Elapsed Day ratio.
3. Cause Code 1 would include maintenance actions resulting from a flooded diesel,
which may explain its higher average costs.
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Appendix D: Priority Code
Table 14: Priority Code Frequency and Meaning
# ofL
Code OcreesMeaning
MANDATORY.
Critical safety or damage control item. Required for performance of
1 104 ship's mission. Required to sustain bare minimum acceptable level of
human needs and sanitation. C-4 CASREP (Casualty Report) on
equipment.
ESSENTIAL.
Extremely important safety or damage control item. Required for
sustained performance of ship's mission. Required to sustain normal
level of basic human needs and sanitation. Required to maintain overall
2 969 integrity of ship or a system essential to ship's mission. Will contribute
so markedly to efficient and economical operation and maintenance of a
vital ship system that the pay-off in the next year will overshadow the
cost to accomplish. Required for minimum acceptable level of
preservation and protection. C-3 CASREP on equipment.
HIGHLY DESIRABLE.
Important safety or damage control item. Required for efficient
performance of ship's mission. Required for normal level of human
comfort. Required for overall integrity of equipment or systems that are
not essential, but are required as backups in case of primary system
failure. Will contribute so markedly to efficient and economical
3 858
operation and/or maintenance of a vital ship system that the payoff in
the next year will at least equal the cost to accomplish. Will effect
major reduction in future ship maintenance in an area or system that
presently cannot be maintained close to acceptable standards. Required
to achieve minimum acceptable level of appearance. C-2 CASREP on
equipment.
34
Table 14: Priority Code Frequency and Meaning (continued)
DESIRABLE.
Some contribution to efficient performance. Some contribution of
normal level of human comfort and welfare. Required for overall
4 1005
integrity of other than an essential system or its backup system. Will
contribute to appearance in an important area. Will significantly reduce
future maintenance.
Blank 1597
Figure 9: Breakdown by Priority Code
Breakdown by Priority Code
a Avg Days U Avg Hours Avg Cost
140 $8,400
120 $7,200
100 -- $6,000 70
80 - -- - - - -$4,800~ 60
80 $3,800 0
40 -- $2,400 4
20 $3,200
0 $0
1 2 3 4 blank
Priority Code
Notes:
sense.
1. The decreasing costs and decreasing efficiency for decreasing Priority Code makes
35
Appendix E: Safety Code
This code is used if the maintenance action describes a problem or condition which has caused,
or has the potential to cause serious injury to personnel or material.
Table 15: Safety Code Frequency and Meaning
CRITICAL SAFETY OR HEALTH DEFICIENCY- CORRECT
IMMEDIATELY.
This category identifies deficiencies which present a critical safety
hazard to personnel or machinery, or a health hazard to personnel, and
which must be corrected immediately. This code is used for items
1 13 such as electric shock hazards, inoperative 
interlocks or safety
devices, missing or damaged lifelines, inoperable escape scuttles,
refrigerants (air conditioning or refrigeration) leaking into confined
spaces, leaking components containing PCBs, and the like. All efforts
must be exerted to correct these items prior to any other maintenance
deficiencies. Suspension of use of the equipment/system/space is
mandatory.
SERIOUS SAFETY OR HEALTH DEFICIENCY-SUSPENSION OF
EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM/SPACE USE IS REQUIRED. This category
2 5 deals with serious safety hazards to personnel or machinery, or health
hazards which must be corrected prior to resuming use of the
equipment/system/space.
MODERATE SAFETY OR HEALTH DEFICIENCY-WAIVER OF
EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM/SPACE USE IS GRANTED PENDING
CORRECTION OF THE ITEM.
3 10 This category is used in cases where the equipment/system/space can
be operated or utilized in a satisfactory manner without greatly risking
physical injury, serious damage to the equipment/system/space, or
greatly risking the health of personnel.
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Table 15: Safety Code Frequency and Meaning (continued)
MINOR SAFETY OR HEALTH DEFICIENCY.
4 6 This is a category of safety or health deficiencies which must be
corrected when resources become available.
NEGLIGIBLE SAFETY OR HEALTH DEFICIENCY.
This category identifies deficiencies which are noted for record
5 31
purposes and may be corrected when other work is accomplished on
the equipment/system/space.
6 1 Varies - local use
X 15 SAFETY RELATED INDICATOR
0 57 MAINTENANCE ACTION IS NOT SAFETY RELATED.
blank 4395
Figure 10: Breakdown by Safety Code
Breakdown by Safety Code
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Appendix F: Status Code
This code most accurately describes the effect of the failure or malfunction on the operational
performance capability of the equipment when the need for maintenance was first discovered.
Table 16: Status Code Frequency and Meaning
0 1581 INot Applicable (use it reporting printing services, etc.)
1 2057 Operational
2 423 Non-Operational
3 472 Reduced Capability
Figure 11: Breakdown by Status Code
Breakdown by Status Code
M Avg Days N Avg Hours A Avg Cost
120 $4,800
100 i$4,000
E 80 -$3,200 0
- 0- $2,400a, 0 r,
L00
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20 $,00
0 -- $0
0 1 2 3
Status Code
Status Code 2 (non-operational) is both the most effective and most expensive, which makes
sense.
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Appendix G: When Discovered Code
This code identifies when the need for maintenance was discovered.
Table 17: When Discovered Code Frequency and Meaning
U Not Applicable (use when reporting printing services, etc.)
1 91 Lighting Off or Starting
2 949 Normal Operation
3 82 During Operability Tests
4 1372 During Inspection
5 8 Shifting Operational Modes
6 271 During PMS
7 8 Securing
8 31 During AEC (Assessment of Equipment) Program
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Figure 12: Breakdown by When Discovered Code
Breakdown by When Discovered Code
E Avg Days U Avg Hours A Avg Cost
300 $4,500
250 - - - ----- --- - -- --- $3,750
200 --- $3,000 0
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A0(
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When Discovered Code
When Discovered Code 6 represents both the most effective and the most expensive maintenance
actions. This makes sense if the PMS uncovers an underlying problem not apparent during
operation.
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